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Solutions: How Much Reform?
Leadership selection in the major multilaterals has become increasingly
divisive, distracting, and, in the case of the WTO, debilitating during the
past decade. Conflict surrounding the candidacy of Koch-Weser at the
IMF undermined the legitimacy of the selection process and divided the
members of the Fund. The first nominations of non-Europeans directly
challenged the European hold on the position of managing director as
well as the convention that has awarded the World Bank presidency to
the United States. A term-sharing agreement that finally ended the lengthy
and bitter leadership battle at the WTO was widely regarded as a bad
solution to an even worse failure of consensus. Preparations for the next
WTO ministerial were delayed; the new director-general was awarded a
divided and politicized organization.
Internal Consideration of Reforms
Given the costs imposed on these key multilateral organizations and the
dissatisfaction among their members, each organization quickly resolved
to consider reforms of leadership selection. At the IMF, the developing
countries and Canada proposed the review, which began in July 2000
with the Japanese executive director as chair. Given the pairing of IMF
and World Bank leadership selection under the US-European conven-
tion, a World Bank working group was convened at the same time.1 On
1. The titles of these groups are the Bank Working Group to Review the Process for
Selection of the President and the Fund Working Group to Review the Process for Selec-
tion of the Managing Director.
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26 April 2001, the IMF executive board endorsed the draft joint report of
the two groups as “guidance for future selection processes.” (The Draft
Joint Report is reproduced in appendix B.) The World Bank executive
directors had endorsed the report on the previous day. Both boards also
stipulated that the endorsement did not constitute a formal decision adopting
the recommendations of the report.2 The draft report was then forwarded
to the International Monetary and Finance Committee, which noted the
report in its 29 April communiqué.3
From the beginning, the IMF and World Bank working groups faced a
strategic decision: whether to confront directly the US-EU convention
that had dominated the selection process in the past or whether to pro-
pose less sensitive changes in the selection process. The working groups
have chosen the second alternative in the draft report, which mentions
the convention briefly and obliquely, first as part of the history of selec-
tion of the heads of IFIs and again in the principles “noted” by the ex-
ecutive board during the last selection, which declared that “the goal is
to attract the best candidates regardless of nationality.” What is left un-
said is that those principles were not adopted then or in this declaration;
the Koch-Weser nomination proceeded to its unhappy conclusion on the
basis of a single European nominee. The draft report does make a num-
ber of recommendations that would substantially alter the selection pro-
cess for the better, however, including the appointment of an advisory
group (search committee) that is discussed below.
The WTO also resolved to draw lessons from its painful selection ex-
perience in 1998-99. Its progress has been slower, however. In July 1999,
the General Council adopted a decision that “ a complete set of rules and
procedures for such appointments shall be elaborated and adopted by the
end of September 2000”.4 Like many of the deadlines during the selections
of directors-general, this one was also missed, because of more pressing
issues surrounding the Seattle ministerial. In July 2000, the chair of the
General Council proposed to begin the process of consultation in autumn
2000 and posed a series of questions on the key issues that would be.5
Many of these were the same questions of process that were under con-
sideration at the IFIs. By early 2001, Ambassador Kare Bryn of Norway
began consultations with member governments on behalf of the General
Council chair. Following these consultations, the chair would formulate
2. The chair’s summary at the IMF executive board meeting of 26 April 2001 is available
as IMF, Press Release No. 01/19, 28 April 2001, http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/
pr/2001/PR0119.htm. The World Bank chair’s summary is available as World Bank Group
New Release No. 2001/319/S, 28 April 2001, http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/news/pressrelease.
nsf/673fa6c5a2d50a67852565e200692a79/ef236a8c7fe41fd785256a3c007960ea?OpenDocument.
3. International Monetary Fund, press release 01/20, 29 April 2001.
4. WTO General Council, Annual Report 1999, 33.
5. Ibid.
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alternatives that could be considered by the General Council. Larger ques-
tions of management structure (such as the deputy directors-general) or
governance were not part of this initial reform exercise. In the first rounds
of consultation, the WTO membership appeared to be more reluctant to
consider far-reaching changes in the selection process.6 The core issues for
the WTO were defined as an authoritative interpretation of consensus
decision rules and a strategy to follow when consensus failed. Behind
these questions remains larger issues of governance as membership in the
global trade organization continues to grow.
Leadership Selection in Other Organizations
6. Interview X, 15 March 2001; Interview U, 15 March 2001.
7. Horton 1999.
The experience of other organizations, public and private, can provide
some guidelines for reform of leadership selection in the major multilaterals.
In their initial search for devices that would improve the legitimacy and
the efficacy of leadership selection, the IFIs in particular have recom-
mended changes that are familiar in other organizations, particularly the
use of a search committee (advisory group). Since the global institutions
have peculiar conventions and decision rules that set them apart from
other large organizations, rules for selection of chief executives in coun-
terpart organizations are unlikely to serve as a useful guide. For those
parts of the selection process that precede a final choice among candi-
dates, however, the parallels are much closer.
A review of current corporate CEO selection practices emphasizes that
most corporations fail to spend enough time on the early stages of the
selection process: defining the skills and experience that are needed, un-
earthing strong candidates, and conducting due diligence on those can-
didates.7 This shortcoming is readily observed among the government
shareholders in leadership selection at the IFIs and the WTO. Qualifica-
tions for the positions are often framed by such vague formulations as
“stature.” No formal proactive process produces candidates. Instead, a
shortlist results from floating names informally or pressing nominees ener-
getically. Often candidates are not well known, and governments do not
spend much time or effort determining their qualifications.
Two other characteristics of selection and retention at other organi-
zations stand in marked contrast to the practice of these international
organizations. Much of the corporate literature on selection of CEOs em-
phasizes traditions of choosing either insiders, groomed for succession,
or outsiders. International institutions invariably choose outsiders, a bias
that probably reflects a determination on the part of member governments
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to prevent collusion between top management and staff. The IFIs and
the WTO have failed to implement another practice that would increase
the leverage of member principals over their agents at the top of these
multilateral institutions. Formal performance reviews are not undertaken
before reappointment of top executives at these organizations. Such broad
evaluations are “increasingly commonplace” in private corporations.8 Such
reviews can unearth hidden shortcomings in top management or signal
pockets of discontent that have not found voice within the organization.
Selection Objectives and a Reformed Process
8. Conger, Finegold, and Lawler (2000, 127).
9. See Woods (2000), De Gregorio et al. (1999, 85-86). For an argument in favor of bal-
ancing financial contributions and wider representation in governance, see Kapur 2000.
As described in chapter 1, national governments that select the leader-
ship of the major economic multilaterals share certain global objectives
for these organizations (good management that furthers the goals they
have set) and for the process itself. Those objectives are combined with
objectives of aligning the organization with national policies (at the ex-
pense of other members’ preferences) and maximizing the presence of
fellow nationals at the top of these organizations. Reforming leadership
selection does not mean the elimination of conflict, which can occur on
any of these dimensions. Nor will it mean the eradication of “politics”
and its replacement with the fantasy of a completely antiseptic, merit-
based selection.
As described in chapter 1, a reformed selection process should produce
consensus on an effective leader through a process of restrained competition.
The desired outcome of the process—an effective leader—is more likely
to be effective if the initial stages of the process are competitive—compari-
sons are made among the widest eligible field—and if the final selection
is one that is acceptable to the largest possible fraction of the member-
ship. This summary definition is controversial in the eyes of some pro-
ponents of greater transparency and “democracy” in these organizations.
They have urged more recorded votes and less reliance on consensus,
since consensus reduces accountability and may obscure pressures ex-
erted by the more powerful on the weak.9
The narratives in chapters 2 and 3 suggest two distinct risks, however.
The WTO selection process was, if anything, too transparent, too com-
petitive, and too much like a domestic majoritarian election, even though
the final ballot was not held. The organization was careening toward an
outcome in which there would have been clear winners and losers, evenly
balanced within the membership. Although such an outcome could be
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sustained in a competitive domestic political system (and was in the US
presidential election in 2000), it is unlikely to produce legitimate and
effective leadership in an international organization. The IFIs, on the other
hand, demonstrated too little competition in the early stages of selection,
when the US-EU convention artificially restricted the field of candidates.
Conflict centered on the quality of the individual produced from such
an artificially restricted field, on interpretation of the convention itself,
and, ultimately, on the legitimacy of the process. Consensus was achieved,
but the organization still bore costs from a flawed process.
These contrasting shortcomings point to two types of reforms. The most
radical—and the most necessary—deal with entrenched practices at the
IFIs and the WTO. At the IFIs, an end to the US-European convention
would widen the field of candidates, introduce welcome competition,
and restore legitimacy to the selection process. The WTO, on the other
hand, requires changes in its governance that will permit a more orderly,
less divisive process that is more likely to result in consensus on a new
director-general. A second set of changes, less likely to attract widespread
opposition, would improve the selection process in each of these organi-
zations and bring their practices into line with other comparable public
organizations. Establishing the qualifications for a successful managing
director, president, or director-general (the prenomination stage); ensur-
ing the largest field of qualified candidates (recruitment and nomination
stage); and selecting a leader by transparent and consensual rules are all
essential to a reformed process of selection.
The US-EU Convention at the IFIs:
Termination or Modification
10. Draft Joint Report (2001), reproduced in appendix B.
n The US-European monopoly on the positions of World Bank president and
IMF managing director should be dismantled through a G-7 declaration that
endorses global diversity in the leadership of these international organiza-
tions and others. If the United States and the European Union are unwilling
to end their duopolies, the other members of the IMF and the World Bank
should insist that two or more candidates be presented for consideration in
the next leadership selection.
The joint report of the World Bank and IMF working groups refers to
principles that were advanced by developing country executive direc-
tors during the last selection of an IMF managing director. Among them
is “a plurality of candidates representing the diversity of members across
regions would be in the best interests of the Fund; the goal is to attract
the best candidates regardless of nationality.”10 Instead of this approach,
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the US-European convention that governed the selection assumed that
any successful candidate would be European.
Among those I interviewed, a surprising number argued that the con-
vention was crumbling. The nominations of Fischer and Sakakibara had
laid down markers for the future: the developing countries and Japan
could in any future selection deny consensus to the candidate proposed
for either the World Bank presidency or the IMF managing directorship.
The rigidity of the convention, although matched by others governing
the regional development banks, is open to charges of blatant discrimi-
nation that would be disallowed if the convention restricted choice on
the basis of gender, religion, or other characteristics. The duopoly held
by the United States and Europe is itself unstable. The US veto of Koch-
Weser and American stipulation of requirements for an IMF managing
director encourage a challenge to its next World Bank nomination. Fi-
nally, the original logic of the convention has long since dissolved. An
American World Bank president is no longer required to maintain the
confidence of capital markets in the World Bank’s financial probity. If an
American passport is no longer a requirement for the World Bank presi-
dency, then the requirement that the IMF managing director be a non-
American (the original formulation of the convention) is also nullified.
Certainly the German government’s efforts to narrow the convention and
render European prerogatives equivalent to American were in entirely
the wrong direction.
Dismantling the convention is overdue. Those who argue that it can-
not be ended base their predictions on the hold of the nationality prin-
ciple and its web of regional and global bargains, as well as the value of
such conventions as sources of reliable political patronage and domestic
political support. Such pessimistic arguments carry some weight, but the
hold of the nationality principle in these organizations must be loosened.
The global multilaterals already have rejected national quotas in their
staffs. Removing the US-European convention simply applies that prin-
ciple of national nondiscrimination to the top management positions. In
establishing a more legitimate set of qualifications for these positions,
the global multilaterals may begin to erode the dominance of the nation-
ality principle in other international institutions as well.
The convention should be dismantled in favor of a clear alternative
criterion: global diversity in leadership of these organizations and others.
A G-7 declaration should embody this new principle of leadership selec-
tion. No country or region should have a perpetual hold on any of these
positions; regional assignments or strict regional rotation—the principle
of selection in many UN agencies—should also be avoided. Without a
clear statement of a positive principle that recognizes a broad geographical
representation in the top global positions over time, the end of the con-
vention could simply mean intensified competition between Europe and
the United States for those positions.
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The most powerful members could be restrained even more explicitly.
Since the United States, Japan, and Europe exercise so much influence
over these organizations, the G-5 governments could agree to a rule of
self-denial: they would not nominate or promote their own nationals for
these positions. Other governments might be permitted to nominate G-5
nationals, but the home government could not. Such an agreement is not
unprecedented. In the early years of the global multilaterals, both the
United States and the European Community tacitly agreed that nationals
of the smaller industrialized economies were preferred candidates for
these positions. The logic was that of the honest broker, a broker with a
strong attachment to the principles and norms of these organizations.
The United States held the World Bank presidency after 1946, but in
1961, smaller European countries claimed the top positions at the IMF,
the GATT, and the OECD. As late as 1975, the same pattern held. In the
1980s and 1990s, however, the larger European states, particularly France,
moved to claim these positions. In returning to a broad truce of this
kind, the United States, the major economies of Europe, and Japan would
signal that their competition for influence would not be played out in
the selection of leaders for these key organizations.
If the convention cannot be ended immediately, more modest reforms
would reduce its negative effects on the candidate pool and the selection
process. First, a degree of competition could be imposed within the con-
straints of the convention: Europe and the United States (or a search
committee) could be asked to present two or more nominees for each
position. The 1987 nominations of Ruding and Camdessus were described
as a European failure by much of the press. In fact, the presence of two
candidates gave the United States, Japan, and the developing countries
more influence over the selection of managing director. Demonstrated
support from outside the United States or Europe could also be required
of nominations. This requirement was one that both the United States
and France imposed informally in the case of the Koch-Weser nomina-
tion in 1999.
Any proposal or schedule to end the US-European convention must
confront additional questions of implementation and effects. Implemen-
tation requires a commitment mechanism, since it is unlikely that selection
of both the World Bank president and the IMF managing director will
take place simultaneously. In other words, if either Europe or the United
States “gives up” its position, it must be assured that its counterpart will
reciprocate in the next round. The reciprocal vetoes that the United States
and Europe hold over each other’s appointments renders this a relatively
easy problem to solve, particularly with a G-7 declaration that commits
both sides to an open selection process. The first mover also might an-
nounce that the selection process will be opened somewhat in its (first)
round, perhaps by increasing the number of candidates. A failure to
reciprocate would then impose lower costs. Perhaps the most effective
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insurance, however, is provided by those outside the convention: Japan
and the developing countries. They could wield their own voting power
as both an incentive for loosening the convention and a means of en-
forcement for any agreed change.
An end to the convention at the IFIs also raises the question of other,
more legitimate constraints on the field of nominees. Some argue that
effective leadership at the IFIs requires a managing director or president
from a creditor country. Any IMF managing director must be able to move
the G-7 in the interests of financial crisis management. Certain leaders
from emerging-market economies could satisfy that criterion for ap-
pointment (Ernesto Zedillo, for example); some candidates from smaller
industrialized countries might fail the test. Former managing director de
Larosière observed that if he had been from an emerging-market country
during the 1980s debt crisis, his ability to deal with that crisis on behalf
of the IMF membership might have been impaired.11 His long-standing
relations with other G-7 finance ministers and central bank governors
provided a reservoir of trust that could be relied upon in dealing with
financial crises. Citizenship in a G-7 or G-10 country may not be a require-
ment for these positions, but familiarity with the dense financial and
monetary networks that link the industrialized countries may well be.
Finally, ending the convention will have direct implications for the
intricate web of appointments based on the nationality principle that ex-
tends far beyond the IFIs. The draft joint report of the IFI working groups
recognizes this ripple effect when it notes that “any decision concerning
the selection process at the Bank and Fund should take into account any
impact on the selection processes at other international financial insti-
tutions.” Any commitment to leadership selection without regard to na-
tionality would eventually extend to the regional development banks. If
the United States could no longer claim the World Bank presidency, it
might (in the absence of the G-5 agreement described earlier) claim the
leadership of some of these institutions. Conversely, if the United States
were to become an active competitor for the top positions in a wider range
of global institutions, its existing claims to the position of deputy in many
of those institutions would be challenged. The unraveling of the conven-
tion is likely to extend well beyond the IFIs: it is a beneficial development,
but one that would require careful negotiation and agreement.
11. Interview I, Jacques de Larosière, Paris, 14 March 2001.
Reforming Governance at the WTO
n Short-term repairs of consensus building at the WTO should be supplemented
by longer-term changes in governance that encourage consensus building
through a new system of representation.
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If the US-European convention overshadows other reforms in leader-
ship selection at the IFIs, reforms at the WTO also confront a deeply
entrenched set of practices—a brand of consensus decision making
that too often fails to produce consensus. The decision rules—formal and
informal—of the IFIs have been more successful than those at the WTO.
The IFIs use a system of weighted voting with a strong overlay of con-
sensus decision making. Weighted voting ensures that the most powerful
members of the organization do not have an aversion to straw votes
or votes, in contrast to the WTO. The use of straw votes in selection of
the IMF managing director has two salutary effects on decision making.
Governments do not become locked into support for particular candi-
dates; they can shift their votes in an effort to build consensus. Straw
votes also provide an accurate gauge of sentiment among the members,
in contrast to the somewhat more opaque consensus-building pro-
cedures at the WTO. In the narrow and hotly contested choice between
Camdessus and Ruding in 1987, a straw vote that gave a narrow major-
ity to Camdessus was finally sufficient to convince Ruding to withdraw
and to allow the unanimous selection of his rival. The Koch-Weser can-
didacy also was ended by a straw vote in which the candidate failed to
receive the support of a majority of the membership. In contrast to con-
sensus decision rules, abstention damages a candidate under IFI voting
rules, since positive support measured by voting shares measures a candi-
date’s support. A large number of abstentions were ultimately fatal to
Koch-Weser’s chances. A more difficult test of IMF consensus building
would have occurred if Koch-Weser had won a narrow majority in the
initial straw vote. Given resistance to his candidacy by the United States
and the developing countries, he might not have won the broad support
awarded past managing directors, even in the absence of an alternative
candidate.
When added to weighted voting, a strong norm of consensus at the
IFIs creates reciprocal vetoes among Europe, Japan, and the United States
and gives considerable influence to the developing countries. In 1973,
the G-10 endorsed a candidate who was vetoed by a developing country
minority. Developing countries also played an important role in both the
Camdessus selection and the failure of the Koch-Weser candidacy. At no
point in the contested decisions for managing director of the IMF has a
candidate been imposed against the wishes of a substantial portion of
the membership. (Since there have been no contested selections at the
World Bank, one can assume that the decision rules of weighted voting
would work in the same way there.)
Compared to the IFIs, WTO decision making operates under several
handicaps. Its developing country members will not allow the intro-
duction of a system of weighted voting that favor the major trading
powers. On the other hand, members, particularly among the industrial-
ized countries, have resisted majority voting in an organization that awards
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one vote to each member. Given these conflicting preferences over de-
cision rules, the WTO is left with a cumbersome system—consensus
decision making without the shadow of a vote—that breaks down too
often. The disarray of the organization during leadership selection is
only one example of weaknesses in its decision making.
Short-term reforms at the WTO require revision of the criteria for as-
sessing candidate support during the consensus-building process. If suc-
cess at the IFIs is based on voting with a strong overlay of consensus,
the WTO should implement changes that preserve consensus decision
making but add a strong overlay of informal voting. Although the US
government was adamantly opposed to either straw votes or recorded
votes during the Moore-Supachai contest, one of the three criteria used
by the General Council chair to assess candidate support was in effect a
simple arithmetic tabulation of support, i.e., a straw vote. Although Moore
had narrowly won on that criterion, member governments supporting
Supachai were unwilling to concede the contest. The other criteria de-
ployed were admitted to be more subjective by the chair and by mem-
ber governments. If developing country members were willing to accept
a “weighted” straw vote based on share of world trade to accompany a
simple one-country, one-vote count, the opponents of voting might ac-
cept these joint indicators of support. If wide geographical spread in
support were retained as a third criterion, then the candidate that ranked
highest on these three criteria would be assumed to have the greatest
chance of winning appointment by consensus. (This would in effect be
consensus defined as concurrent majorities on the first two criteria with
a measure of geographical distribution for the third.)
An alternative means of assessment is a modification of approval vot-
ing, in which member governments indicate their support for as many
of the candidates as they wish, without ranking those candidates.12 A
simple tally of these votes would provide relative measures of candidate
support. Approval voting avoids some of the pitfalls of strategic and
insincere voting that can occur under systems that eliminate candi-
dates in successive rounds of balloting. (The chair evaluated candidate
support in the 1998-99 WTO leadership selection through successive
rounds in which lagging candidates were eliminated from the competi-
tion.) Approval voting also avoids the outcome that infuriated many of
the Supachai coalition: a candidate who leads consistently in successive
ballots and is then overtaken by another candidate who picks up the
second-place votes of eliminated candidates. In the context of consensus
decision rules, approval voting would require some modification. If a
veto-proof shortlist of candidates were created, as described below, then
all of the candidates would in some sense be “approved” by all member
12. On approval voting, see Brams and Fishburn (1983), Hinich and Munger (1997, 107-
09), and Fishburn (1986).
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governments. Approval voting in this case would necessarily mean more
than “acceptable.”
Voting under tight prior constraints could provide a third solution to
the difficulties in consensus building at the WTO. Several members called
for a vote during the Moore-Supachai contest, but many more resisted
their call. Votes are explicitly allowed under the WTO Charter. If the
membership agreed that a vote for director-general would only occur
when consensus building had failed and that voting would be restricted
to the selection process alone, members might become more comfortable
with that alternative. Given the breakdown in consensus norms at the
WTO, however, simple voting is not likely to produce directors-general
who enjoy strong support from the membership. Any device that re-
sembles voting should include explicit supermajority or concurrent ma-
jority rules that would guarantee success for a candidate only if her base
of support were broad and representative of the membership.
Simple repairs of the WTO rules for consensus building will probably
fail to produce a more efficient and less conflictual leadership selection.
Reform of the leadership selection process should be embedded in broader
governance changes. Decision making under the WTO borrowed from
GATT consensus decision making by informal restriction on participa-
tion, the “concentric circles” or “green room” process. No formal rules
determined which governments were admitted to these “issue-specific
inner circles” that reached a tentative consensus on the issue at hand
and then presented it to a wider group of members or to the member-
ship as a whole.13
As both membership and stakes in the global trading system expanded
in the 1990s, those members excluded from the innermost circles came
to view this system as elitist and opaque. The consensus reached among
the smaller group of members was viewed as a fait accompli presented
to the membership as a whole. Since there were no formal criteria for
inclusion or exclusion in these negotiating and discussion forums, their
legitimacy could not be defended easily. As Richard Blackhurst describes,
this consensus-building model can be improved by better dissemination
of information and documentation to the wider membership. Those on
the inside (or WTO staff members) could play a more active role in ob-
taining their reactions to the evolving consensus. Finally, however, some
of the enlarged membership will be excluded from green-room meetings
that they wish to attend in the interests of decision-making efficiency.14
Many members are reluctant to delegate decision-making powers at
the WTO. In substantive negotiations, this delegation took place through
the green-room process. In leadership selection, members delegated a
13. Blackhurst (2001); Schott and Watal (2000); Schott (2000).
14. Blackhurst (2001).
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central role in assessing and building consensus to the General Council
chair. In 1999, members challenged his role and the rules governing his
actions in much the same way that they challenged the central role of
the major trading powers in the WTO’s concentric circles of negotia-
tion. What must be reconstructed in any reformed WTO decision-making
structure is governance that is more representative, transparent, and le-
gitimate than the older practices of delegation and, at the same time,
more efficient than existing consensus building on the basis of individual
delegations.15
Observers of the WTO converge on a common solution that would
move the WTO in the direction of the IFIs and other comparable global
organizations. Three former directors-general recently called for exami-
nation of “a management board which could take routine decisions not
affecting members’ rights” and “a wider, senior level policy consultancy
group to ensure that current trade issues are debated in the widest policy
context.”16 Blackhurst and Schott have proposed similar representative
bodies in the form of a WTO consultative board or a “small informal
steering committee . . . that can be delegated responsibility for develop-
ing consensus on trade issues among the member countries.”17 Schott’s
proposed body is more formal than Blackhurst’s (the latter’s consultative
board would only meet when a green-room meeting could not accom-
modate all those who wished to participate). Neither proposes an execu-
tive board that could take binding decisions on behalf of the member-
ship, and neither argues for a revision of the WTO’s consensus rules. In
effect, both urge a more representative entity at the center of consensus
building, one that would either supersede or supplement the green-room
model that has recently failed. Representation on this board or commit-
tee would take place through regional or other groups freely chosen by
member governments.
If representative bodies of this kind existed at the WTO, leadership
selection might enjoy some of the advantages of the IFIs, although con-
sensus decision rules would still produce a higher probability of dead-
lock. The leadership selection process would become more orderly, and
its dynamic would be removed from the freelancing and uncoordinated
activities of national delegations. The locus for building consensus would
certainly be clearer, and the burden of managing the cumbersome pro-
cess, now placed on the General Council chair, would be better distrib-
uted. Unfortunately, even modest reform proposals of this kind are un-
likely to be implemented soon. The membership will not accept even an
15. On institutional solutions to the problem of large-number decision making, see Kahler
(1993).
16. Dunkel, Sutherland, and Ruggiero (2001).
17. Schott and Watal (2000), 3; Blackhurst (2001).
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informal board in the current climate, in which “internal transparency”
is defined as opposition to small-group delegation.
Parameters of Leadership Selection
18. The large countries in the European Union will give up their second commissioner
beginning in 2005. It was also agreed at Nice that after 2007 (and further enlargement),
the size of the commission might be capped at 20, which implies that every member
would not have an appointment on the commission.
The changes just described—ending the US-European convention at the
IFIs and transforming decision making at the WTO—are reforms that
are critical to the legitimacy and effectiveness of these organizations. They
also are controversial and contentious in their own right. Other reforms
would serve to improve the leadership selection process in the absence
of these more fundamental measures. Even if constraints such as the US-
European convention persist, these proposals would define a selection
process that is both more competitive and more likely to achieve consen-
sus on an effective leader.
The first three address boundaries that shape the entire selection cycle
in these organizations: participation by a semi-integrated Europe, the lo-
cus of oversight in national governments, and the timeliness of selection.
n Leadership selection in global institutions should be insulated from bargain-
ing over top regional positions in Europe and elsewhere. In the longer run,
European representation in global institutions should be consolidated.
Individual European governments have retained membership in the
global multilaterals, despite the growing competence of the European
Union in commercial, monetary, and financial affairs. Europe’s uncertain
unity within the global multilaterals has created two points of conflict
with the rest of the world. First, the nationality principle remains power-
ful within the European Union. Bargaining among European governments
over positions within the European Union and other regional and inter-
national organizations has been tightly linked to leadership selection in
the three global multilaterals. European governments value the patron-
age and symbolism of a presence on the commission and other Euro-
pean bodies, for example. As recently as the Nice Summit in December
2000, the smaller members of the European Union resisted fiercely and
successfully attempts to reduce their individual hold on appointments to
the commission.18 Since this is one of the supranational organs of the
European Union, the logic behind rigid national apportionment is even
less convincing than it is at the global level. Given the continuing hold
of the nationality principle within Europe, Europe may not be willing to
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accept a selection process in global organizations that moves away from
that principle. As one American policymaker remarked acidly, until the
Europeans stop treating these global positions “like trading cards,” con-
flict is likely to continue.19
European bargains have regularly influenced the candidate pool at
the global level. A decision on the OECD secretary-general’s renewal
was delayed in 1994 because of indecision in Europe regarding the next
president of the European Commission. When talented Italian candidates
were mentioned during the 1999-2000 IMF selection, they were quickly
set aside to avoid offending Germany (“Germany’s turn”). They were
also ruled out in part because Italy had just obtained the presidency of
the European Commission (Romano Prodi) with German support. Britain’s
hold on the top civilian NATO position weighed against its national can-
didates as well.
Whether deeply ingrained EU bargaining based on national balancing
will be modified over time is uncertain. In the near term, the global multi-
laterals could attempt to discourage national “trades” across regional
and global lines. In other words, internal European or regional bargain-
ing over positions according to the nationality principle should not be
allowed to spill over into the selection process for global organizations.
If regions wish to embrace the nationality principle in their internal allo-
cation of positions, those allocations should be divorced, so far as pos-
sible, from global selections.
National bargaining and balancing within Europe is only one effect that
Europe’s partial integration has on global selection, however. “Europe”
itself has been a variable in these selections. At times, the European Union
worked assiduously to present a single candidate (always a European
candidate, of course) for the top positions at the IMF or the GATT/WTO.
European diplomacy mobilized behind Ruggiero’s candidacy for the
WTO director-generalship in 1994-95 and (late in the game) Koch-
Weser’s candidacy for the IMF managing directorship in 1999-2000, spurred
in the latter case by German complaints of US “bullying.” When there was
no European candidate in play, Europe often failed to develop a common
position or to exercise needed leadership. The fractious WTO leadership
contest in 1998-99 was the clearest example. By agreement, Europe could
not have a candidate in that race. It divided its support among all of the
candidates, and in the climactic meetings of the General Council was
unable to use its collective weight in favor of a consensus candidate or a
set of procedures. In this instance, national governments jealously guarded
their prerogatives vis-à-vis the European Commission.
Consolidation of European representation in these organizations will
offer a solution in the longer term. As C. Randall Henning has described,
19. Interview K, 31 October 2000.
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the present constituency system inflates the weight of Europe within the
IFIs. Nine different executive directors represent the 15 members of the
European Union. European executive directors also represent a large number
of non-EU governments in their constituencies, and those governments
tend to follow the lead of their EU executive directors.20 The mixed con-
stituency system hinders European coordination at the IMF and World
Bank; despite efforts to reach a common European position, multiple inter-
ventions at executive board meetings are still typical.21 An added compli-
cation is the Eurogroup (members of the Economic and Monetary Union),
which does not include the United Kingdom, an important financial power
and a member of the G-7.
Although consolidation of the European position in these organizations
could contribute to a more coherent European presence and participa-
tion, the process is likely to be a long one. The current semi-integrated
equilibrium creates confusion for the rest of the world, but it satisfies
some EU members, particularly the smaller members that head their own
constituencies at the IMF and World Bank. Since those members are not
part of the G-7, they face a substantial diminution in their weight within
the IFIs after consolidation. Consolidation also could bring paralysis to
the IFIs if the European Union does not agree to internal decision rules
that would ease the development of a common external policy.22 If single
members could block a common position, the effects on the global orga-
nizations could be even worse than the current mixed status. Henning
outlines a bargain that might eventually be reached at the IMF: clarifica-
tion of how the EMU would establish a common position within the
global multilaterals; consolidation of the European quota and voting weight
to match that of the United States; and retention of the IMF headquar-
ters in Washington, DC. Discussions to reach a similar bargain at each of
the global multilaterals affected by European unifications should begin
sooner rather than later.
n The selection of new leaders should be managed at the ministerial level.
Selection has suffered from excessive and early involvement by top
political leaders, who commit their governments to particular candidates
and make considered comparisons or final consensus difficult. German
Chancellor Schröder pushed the candidacy of Koch-Weser at the IMF in
the face of clear negative signals from the United States and other mem-
bers of the European Union. High-level political attention ensured that
the final veto of Koch-Weser’s candidacy was more damaging to the
20. Henning (1997); Henning and Padoan (2000, 47-51).
21. Interview L, 2 November 2000.
22. Henning (1997), 55.
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individual candidate, the credibility of the German government, and US-
German relations than a nomination managed by the finance ministry.
In some WTO campaigns, pressure was exerted on behalf of candidates
by the highest levels of national government. On the other hand, the
1998-99 WTO selection owed part of its intensity and final deadlock to a
dynamic created by delegations in Geneva, national representa-tives that
were not closely monitored by their capitals.
Engagement and monitoring at the ministerial level situates these con-
tests at the appropriate level of political and policy importance. Ministerial
oversight also may reduce the prominence awarded the nationality prin-
ciple when top political leaders are involved.
n If deadlines established for a selection cannot be met, the selection process
should begin anew. Interim leadership should be chosen in the absence of
agreement within the time limits.
Inability to reach a timely decision on new leadership has plagued
leadership selection at the IMF and the WTO. Delays and failures to
meet self-imposed deadlines have spurred internal reform initiatives. Estab-
lishing a clear time line for each stage of the process, particularly nomi-
nation and final selection, could prevent some of the perverse results
observed in recent selections. If nominations are never in fact closed,
governments will delay a decision among existing nominees and hope
that a white knight will save them from an unattractive choice.
If deadlines for selection are not met, interim leadership should be
installed and the selection process should be reopened, beginning with
new nominations. At the WTO, the terms of deputy directors-general
should be staggered to provide interim leadership if necessary. Term
sharing, a resolution of last resort at the WTO in 1999, should be avoided.
Its Solomonic solution creates instantaneous lame ducks and fails to per-
mit consistent leadership that matches an organization’s program cycle.
Meeting deadlines at each stage of the process should become less diffi-
cult if more time is spent in the initial stages developing clear criteria
and minimal qualifications for each position and recruiting a strong field
of candidates.
Reforming the Process:
From Search to Reappointment
In addition to reforms specific to each organization and proposals
that deal with the entire cycle of leadership selection, the choice of
a chief executive would be improved by changes at each stage in the
selection process. These recommendations are directed to all of the
organizations.
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Candidate Qualifications: Revising
the Criteria of Effective Leadership
23. Köhler has had the most extensive experience in private banking, as head of the
German Savings Bank Association from 1993 to 1998.
n At the start of each selection cycle, the governing body of each organization
should establish precise minimum qualifications and a list of desirable char-
acteristics for the next leader. Qualifications and characteristics should track
current and prospective organizational agendas.
The draft joint report of the Bank and Fund working groups urges
executive directors to “establish clear criteria for identifying, nominat-
ing, and selecting qualified candidates for the posts.” Historically, career
profiles and implicit qualifications for candidates have been remarkably
consistent in these organizations. Members have rarely questioned those
implicit selection criteria. At least one of the divisive episodes described—
the IMF managing director selection in 1999-2000—might have been avoided
if minimum qualifications had been specified in advance.
With one exception, managing directors of the IMF have satisfied one
of two career profiles: on the one hand, finance minister or central bank
governor of a small European country (1946-63, 1973-78) or a directeur
du trésor or central bank governor of France (1963-73, 1978-2000). The
sole exception, Jacobsson, arrived at the Fund from a central bank milieu,
the BIS. Since the IMF’s role has changed dramatically as private finance
has come to dominate the global monetary and financial systems, quali-
fications for a successful managing director should presumably change
as well. The IMF has recently emphasized building its expertise in pri-
vate financial markets, although no recent managing director has had
extensive experience in private finance.23 Since central bank governors
and ministers of finance make the selection, their natural tendency is to
choose “one of us.” A strong case can be made that Robert Rubin, former
US secretary of the treasury and Arminio Fraga, current central bank
governor of Brazil, illustrate a career path that should characterize fu-
ture managing directors: substantial understanding of private financial
markets combined with a background in public finance and macroeco-
nomic policy.
Paradoxically, the World Bank has clung to its defining qualifications—
a career in private finance—as the organization has become more in-
volved in a wider range of development activities. Only two World Bank
presidents—McNamara and Conable—did not arrive at the Bank after a
career on Wall Street. (McNamara did bring important financial and pri-
vate sector expertise.) The World Bank has perhaps the most difficult
task in defining a realistic job description and set of qualifications for its
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presidency. The Bank may find few individuals who combine expertise
in economic development and private finance as well as an ability to
voice the development agenda and mobilize the Bank’s diverse constitu-
encies. Rather than producing a wish list of characteristics that have no
chance of realization, the Bank and the other multilaterals may wish to
explicitly or implicitly select a management team, in which deputies or
vice presidents provide essential elements in the required package of
expertise. Of course, if the choice of deputies is constrained by national
or regional considerations, constructing such a management team will
be more difficult.
At the WTO, members have failed to pay careful attention to neces-
sary qualifications before nominations are opened. In this case, however,
a marked shift occurred over the past decade in the qualifications de-
manded of a director-general. From the retirement of Eric Wyndham White
until the selection of Sutherland, the GATT director-general was a Swiss
economic diplomat. Confronting the end of the Uruguay Round, GATT
members opted for an energetic politician to close the final bargains.
After the foundation of the WTO, however, political seniority or “stat-
ure” seemed to become an overriding qualification overnight, as the
nominations in 1994-95 and 1998-99 indicated. All candidates in the most
recent selections have been cabinet ministers, prime ministers, or presi-
dents. Whether such high political rank had any close association with
likely success as director-general is far from clear. Political qualifications
certainly raised the stakes and the level of conflict in each contest. WTO
members should examine whether the new responsibilities of a WTO
director-general require such a radical alteration in the qualifications ac-
cepted under the GATT.
National government principals should avoid one common assump-
tion in framing qualifications: the organization needs someone like us.
The IMF may require an individual with more experience in private fi-
nancial markets than the average finance minister or central bank gover-
nor. The WTO may not require a trade minister or senior politician as
director-general. Some of the most successful heads of these organiza-
tions have had strong political skills without the handicaps of a political
career: McNamara, de Larosière, Camdessus, and Dunkel. Finally, re-
quired expertise need not be found in a single individual. More efficient
use of top positions in these organizations can create management teams
that are stronger than any of the individuals who compose them.
The experience of the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO point to
several lessons that might be applied if these organizations begin a more
systematic examination of the qualities desired or required for their top
positions. Only the membership or their representatives can define those
qualities; the task cannot be delegated. Successful leadership of these
organizations requires reexamination of the principal purposes of the
organization over time. If those purposes are obscure, identifying the
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best candidates or field of candidates will be difficult at best. Desirable
qualities in a leader may vary with the cycle of an organization’s activities.
At the WTO, for example, directors-generals who broker trade negotia-
tions may require different skills than those who oversee the implemen-
tation of negotiation results.
Remarkable consistency in the career profiles of candidates over time
(with a shift in profile from the GATT to the WTO) may suggest a fail-
ure to reexamine the necessary qualifications for top leaders. It may also
demonstrate a unwillingness to engage in a proactive process of re-
cruitment and expansion of the candidate pool. A woman has never
been nominated for any of these positions. Supachai is the only national
of a developing country selected to head any of these organizations. Can-
didates have all reflected a certain view of necessary seniority: youth
has not been an advantage. Most important, bargaining and conventions
based on the nationality principle have severely constrained the pool of
candidates.
Expanding the Candidate Pool:
Constraints and Search Committees
n Each organization should reexamine its historical reluctance to consider can-
didates from within the organization for the top leadership position.
Although the nationality principle has imposed the most significant
informal constraints on candidate nomination and selection, all of these
organizations also have observed another unbroken rule: successful can-
didates are never found among those who work in the organization. This
practice stands in stark contrast to many other organizations, which may
decide between inside and outside candidates, but rarely disqualify in-
siders. Until Fischer was nominated for managing director at the IMF,
no one within the organization had been a candidate for the top job.
(Koch-Weser had spent much of his career at another IFI, but he was not
at that post when nominated.)
Since the grooming of potential successors is an important part of lead-
ership selection in many private corporations, this peculiarity requires
explanation. The national principals in these organizations may turn to
outsiders because of their belief that the top job is political, rather than
technical, and requires a careful balancing of national preferences. Para-
chuting an outsider into the organization also may reinforce member
control over management and prevent the development of internal net-
works that could reduce their influence over time. Even the nomination
of Fischer, who had been at the IMF for only six years, did not violate
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this precept entirely. If these organizations move toward the develop-
ment of management teams, however, promotion from the inside might
be considered more easily. In any case, automatic elimination of this pool
of possible candidates deserves reexamination.
n Search committees should be used to develop a long list of qualified candidates
for each selection. The committee should actively and confidentially recruit and
evaluate candidates on behalf of the executive boards (IFIs) or general council
(WTO). Evaluations should adhere to the qualifications and characteristics
stipulated by each organization at the start of the selection process.
The most innovative suggestion in the joint Bank-Fund report on leader-
ship selection is the proposed advisory group (AG) or search committee
that would assist the executive directors in the first stages of leadership
selection. As the joint report suggests, composition of the AG might it-
self become a point of conflict, since that group would shape the “long
list” of candidates for top positions. What is most original in the descrip-
tion of the AG is the extensive delegation that the IFIs would make to a
group composed entirely of knowledgeable outsiders, “eminent persons
familiar with the goals of the institution and drawn from, but not neces-
sarily restricted to, academia, diplomacy/international affairs, and inter-
national development, banking, or finance.”24 Geographical balance would
also figure in the composition of the AG. Only the dean of each execu-
tive board, a figure who has traditionally organized and overseen the
selection process, would serve as an observer on the AG and as liaison
to the executive board. The AG itself could call on additional executive
search expertise to accomplish its task, which is the construction of an
unranked long list of candidates, based on the qualifications previously
agreed by the respective executive boards. The list would be submitted
to the executive directors accompanied by assessments made by the AG.
This early stage in the selection process would necessarily be confidential.
The proposed advisory group provides a strong basis for a reformed
search and nomination procedure at the IFIs and the WTO. A search
committee serves two valuable roles in a reformed selection process: widen-
ing the candidate pool and providing evaluations that effectively elimi-
nate unqualified candidates. Current selection procedures rely exclusively
on government nominations in the early stages of the cycle. A proactive ad-
visory group or search committee could solicit nominations and determine
levels of interest among a much wider candidate pool. Women, for ex-
ample, who have been absent from the candidate lists in these organiza-
tions, could be actively recruited.
Although the draft report is not explicit on the source of nominations
or suggestions to the AG, it does indicate that nominees must be acceptable
24. Draft Joint Report, paragraph 10 (reproduced in appendix B).
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to their governments and that their governments must be members of
the organization. The search committee should solicit suggestions and
recommendations from a wide range of sources, governmental and non-
governmental. Governments should be encouraged to nominate talented
individuals who might be ignored by their home governments. This pro-
vides another avenue for eroding the nationality principle, since national
governments often decline to nominate highly qualified candidates for
political or ideological reasons. Nongovernmental organizations, often
critical of the global economic organizations for their lack of transpar-
ency, should also be encouraged to submit nominations. Through their
national governments, nongovernmental organizations have participated
in the selection of the heads of UN specialized agencies. The expert in-
formation that they have provided on candidates has often been useful
to member governments.25 Given the confidentiality that is necessarily
imposed at this stage in the selection process, little harm can come from
a large number of nominations, so long as those individuals fit the quali-
fications specified by the governing boards.
Matching nominees with stated qualifications is a second contribution
of a search committee. Its collective assessment of candidates is less
likely to be colored by national bias. Even without the power to elim-
inate candidates, a search committee could perform the valuable role of
a gatekeeper, preventing national governments from promoting clearly
unqualified candidates without objection or comment. The mere fact of
an expanded candidate pool would also offer a clearer benchmark
against which national favorites could be compared. In this second role,
the search committee would vet candidates in a fashion similar to the
American Bar Association review of US federal judicial appointments.
Their evaluation could be overridden in the next stage of the process, but
the existence of such an assessment would provide a valuable resource
at that later, more political stage.
Constructing a Veto-Proof Shortlist
n The submission of the search committee’s annotated list of qualified candi-
dates to the governing bodies of these organizations begins the most import-
ant phase in the selection process. National governments, through the governing
bodies, must next construct a list of acceptable candidates—a veto-proof shortlist.
If the organizations can determine acceptable procedures for building such a
list, they should be able to avoid deadlock over final selection.
Perhaps the most important stage in the nomination process follows
the submission of the AG’s “long list” to the executive board. It is at this
25. Interview P, 2 November 2000.
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point, the construction of a shortlist of candidates, that national govern-
ments would become directly involved. The draft report indicates that
governments could nominate additional candidates at this point in the
process, but the search committee would vet those candidates like all
others. (In other words, governments could not force their favored can-
didates into the process without independent scrutiny.) The draft report
also suggests that the usual formal or informal decision rules could be
used to decide on the shortlist.
What the draft report does not mention is most critical for avoiding
later deadlock over candidates. At this point in the process, governments
should exercise their veto regarding any candidates that are unacceptable
to them. They should be required to give cause, within the confidential
confines of the executive board or general council, for their decision.
After the shortlist is constructed, however, it should be veto-proof. Reach-
ing final consensus on a single candidate would then become much easier.
In other words, all candidates on the short list should be at least accept-
able to a broad cross section of the membership.
Each organization must decide the breadth of support required for a
candidate to reach the shortlist. A certain level of cross-regional support,
for example, could be necessary for inclusion. At the IFIs, a minimum
share of votes might be a prerequisite. In past selection cases, governments
were sometimes unwilling to register strong opposition to a candidate
early in the process. Although the United States and other governments
clearly signaled their dissatisfaction with the Koch-Weser candidacy
in 1999, a formal refusal to support his candidacy came too late to
avoid public division among governments and the unnecessary em-
barrassment of a talented public servant. In similar fashion, although
all governments signaled the broad acceptability of the four candidates
for director-general at the WTO in December 1998, it became clear that
on either side of the Moore-Supachai contest there were governments
who were in effect unwilling to countenance a full term for the other
candidate.
Governments often are unwilling to risk offense to a friendly govern-
ment by signaling that its candidate is unacceptable. Preparation of an
annotated long list of candidates by a search committee would provide
governments with convenient cover for vetoing candidates. The evalua-
tions of the AG will provide ammunition against clearly unqualified can-
didates as well as making it difficult to veto “high potential” candidates.26
The procedure—like all other mechanisms—is not proof against either
governments that fail to signal their opposition to candidates honestly or
new information that hardens opposition to a candidate after the short-
list has been constructed. (Such information, derived from Supachai’s
campaign, seemed to have hardened US opposition to his candidacy.)
26. That qualifier is used in the Draft Joint Report (see appendix B).
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Nevertheless, arriving at a shortlist of highly qualified candidates, each
acceptable to most, if not all, member governments, would reduce the
burden of consensus building that currently rests on formal and informal
decision rules.
Candidate Information and Candidate Campaigns
n Additional information on the shortlist of candidates should be made available
to member governments, but active campaigning by national governments in
support of candidates should be discouraged.
With the creation of a shortlist of candidates the balance between con-
fidentiality and transparency in the selection process would tilt decid-
edly toward transparency. When the names of the shortlisted candidates
become public, a wider range of interested parties will enter the debate
over their qualities. During its last selection, the WTO General Council
invited all candidates to Geneva for informational sessions, a useful in-
novation that might be replicated in the other global multilaterals.
Active campaigning, on the other hand, has become increasingly com-
mon in leadership contests and has had increasingly negative effects.
Although campaigns provide additional information regarding the can-
didates, they often force candidates and their supporting governments
into hardened positions. At the WTO, intense campaigning has politi-
cized the organization. Allegations were made in the last selection that
positions were promised in exchange for support. Since restraints on
campaigning by governments or candidates are difficult to enforce, limits
should be placed on what the candidates can offer. For example, by firmly
fixing in advance the number of DDG positions and the qualifications of
those who will fill those positions, the WTO could limit further politicization
of the organization. In addition, members of the WTO staff should be
forbidden to participate actively or covertly in the campaigns of any can-
didates for director-general. The organizations also could reduce some
of the incentives to campaign by providing additional venues at which
candidates could introduce themselves to member governments.
Reducing the Stakes: Term Limits,
Formal Review, and Collective Leadership
n Conflict over leadership selection can be eased by lowering the stakes of each
contest. Three innovations serve this purpose:
(1) term limits, fixed in advance;
(2) formal performance reviews before reappointment; and
(3) construction of leadership teams at the top of each organization.
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Conflict surrounding leadership selection can be reduced if the stakes
at issue are also reduced. Rising conflict over leadership selection is owed
in part to the growing importance of these organizations, whether mea-
sured by expanding memberships or wider scope. Ending the convention
and otherwise undermining the nationality principle would lower the
symbolic stakes of these contests. Leaders also might promote policies
opposed by members or simply mismanage the organization. These po-
tential agency costs also increase the stakes of leadership selection.
Three reforms serve to reduce the risks of incompetent or unrespon-
sive management for member governments. Term limits are perhaps the
easiest to implement. The draft joint report on leadership selection at the
IFIs suggests that Bank presidents and IMF managing directors should not
serve more than two terms.27 Fixing maximum terms in advance allows
for orderly succession, and, at the same time, permits successful presi-
dents or managing directors to complete major initiatives. At the IMF,
term limits of this kind would have allowed the US government to avoid
its blunt and embarrassing veto of a third term for Managing Director
Schweitzer. Term limits also would have eliminated the cause for conflict
over Paye’s reappointment at the OECD. In most international organiza-
tions, term limits are seldom imposed, and evicting incompetent leader-
ship is often difficult. Unfortunately, at the WTO, the membership has
moved in the opposite direction and shortened the terms of directors-
general in the last two leadership cycles. These abbreviated terms make it
difficult for directors-general to see major initiatives, such as new trade
rounds, through to completion.28
A second strategy for monitoring leadership performance is the in-
stitution of performance reviews before reappointment. In many other
organizations, performance reviews are accepted as a condition for re-
appointment. Even if the likely outcome is reappointment, review provides
a useful safety valve for members who are concerned that a managing
director or director-general might perform badly and still remain in office.
Both term limits and reviews, which could shorten tenure if performance
is poor, reduce the risks to the membership in any initial appointment.
By reducing the risks that an appointed leader will be retained despite
poor performance, these rules and practices reduce the stakes in a par-
ticular selection. If members perceive lower stakes, conflict over initial
appointments may decline.
A third avenue for reducing the stakes at issue in leadership selection
has been mentioned: elevate the stature of deputies and select a manage-
ment team along with the chief executive. A reformed leadership selection
27. Draft Joint Report, paragraph 14 (see appendix B).
28. Ruggiero was limited to one term of four years; Moore and Supachai were each
awarded three-year terms with no possibility of renewal.
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process and an appropriate management structure require separate discus-
sion and evaluation. As the narratives in chapters 2 and 3 demonstrate,
however, the two intersect at a number of points. The appointment of
deputies can serve to complicate selection of the top executive or to re-
duce the likelihood of divisive conflict over the top position.
To the degree that the nationality principle motivates national govern-
ments and governs appointments, deputies have provided compensation
for those who do not obtain the top position. Extending the nationality
principle to the next tier of organizational leadership (delicately termed
geographical balance) may reduce pressure for fellow nationals in the
top position. On the other hand, claims for fairer distribution of deputy
director-general posts at the WTO have driven the numbers of DDGs up
over time and created new conflicts among members. (Witness the wide-
spread resentment over DDG compensation to Kim in 1995.) If the US-
European convention is ended at the IFIs, the current national distribu-
tion of deputies will be questioned at both the IMF and the WTO. In
particular the claim of the United States for a senior deputy at each of
these organizations will no longer appear legitimate.
Movement toward appointment of deputies through a merit-based
rather than nationality-driven process can contribute to an improved
selection process for the chief executive. Division of labor and expertise
among senior management permits a more realistic and confident assess-
ment of the skills required for the top post. Stipulated qualifications for
the top position may become more precise and less daunting as a result.
So long as their terms do not run concurrently with the top leadership
post, deputies can provide the interim leadership required when top leader-
ship selection fails to find a candidate. Deputies might even provide
candidates for the top position itself if the constraints of the nationality
principle are stripped away and the bias against internal candidate eases.
Finally, the creation of a management team at the top of these organiza-
tions is a further means of reducing the stakes in selection of the chief
executive. Since a highly qualified top management team could compen-
sate for the shortcomings of a chief executive, the stakes in choosing a top
leader diminish.
The changes advocated here will not end conflict over leadership selec-
tion in the major global economic organizations. Arguments about the
best candidate for a position also are arguments about the future of these
organizations, and those debates are necessary and valuable for the
organizations themselves. Reforms of this kind do promise better leader-
ship for organizations that confront changing global responsibilities and
the demands of large and growing memberships. The reforms that are
A Reformed Selection Process
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most significant—ending the convention that constrains selection at the
IFIs and transforming governance at the WTO—also will face the most
political resistance from member governments. Specification of qualifica-
tions, expansion of the pool of candidates, and constructing a veto-proof
shortlist also are useful parts of a reform agenda. Reducing the stakes in
each leadership contest may serve to minimize unwanted conflict. These
reforms promise both a process that is less divisive and distracting and
an outcome that is more legitimate. The key question remaining is whether
the most powerful member governments have an interest in reform.
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